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Costly Litigation and Legal Error
under Negligence
KEITIH N. HYLTON

Northwestern University School of Law

1. INTRODUCTION

In this article, private enforcement under negligence when there
error and litigation is costly is examined. Ordover (1978) demonstr
in a negligence regime in which there is no legal error and litigation i
equilibrium requires the presence of actors who refuse to obey the due
standard. Accordingly, in such a negligence regime, an undercom
equilibrium must result. Since the existence of litigation costs imp
the socially optimal level of care is greater than that required by the
tional Hand formula, which defines negligence as a failure to take care

the cost of taking care is less than the expected loss if the accident occu

is a short step from Ordover's undercompliance result to the conclusio

injurers,2 under negligence, exercise less than the socially optimal
precaution (see Hylton).
It is demonstrated that, because of legal error, an undercomplian
librium need not result under negligence. In a negligence regime i
courts err and litigation is costly, perfect and overcompliance equil

For helpful comments I thank Ian Ayres, John Donohue, David Haddock, Tom Pala
Siegelman, and two anonymous referees.
1. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). The Hand fo
the traditional due-care standard under negligence.
2. It should be noted that this article does not discuss the level of care exerci
potential victims, nor does it address the activity levels of injurers or victims.
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possible. In such equilibria, the probability of a negligence verdict will
simply be the probability that the court erroneously finds the defendant
negligent (i.e., the probability of type-2 error).3 It follows that suits brought

in perfect and in overcompliance equilibria may be called "false claims" in
the sense that they are brought against nonnegligent defendants. Indeed,
the paradox of negligence litigation is that a perfect compliance equilibrium
is made possible by the existence of actors who bring suit in the expectation

that damages will be awarded because of error.
An implication of this analysis is that legal error may be desirable on
second-best grounds in a negligence regime in which litigation is costly. In
this model, an equilibrium in which perfect compliance is observed cannot
occur unless there is legal error, and, more precisely, unless the probability
of type-2 error is positive.
Although a perfect compliance equilibrium is shown to be achievable, it is

also shown that underdeterrence results unless the Hand formula is modi-

fied to incorporate litigation costs. Whether the equilibrium is one of perfect

or overcompliance, negligence, as defined by the traditional due-care standard, fails to provide incentives for all actors to exercise the socially optimal
level of care.

In particular, those actors for whom the cost of taking care exceeds the
expected losses imposed on others-in other words, those actors who only
because of error will be held liable under the traditional due-care standard-

never, as a group, have incentives to exercise socially optimal precaution
under negligence. The reason is that the traditional due-care standard does
not take litigation costs into account. Because of this, there will be some
actors among this group for whom taking care is socially desirable, even
though the cost of taking care, for such actors, exceeds the expected losses
imposed on others. They can be compelled to exercise socially optimal precaution by internalizing society's costs. But this group bears only the losses
of victims who bring suit under negligence, and even then only when type-2
error occurs. Since this is insufficient to align their incentives with the social
desirability criterion, negligence fails to compel this type of actor to exercise

the socially optimal level of care.
With respect to those actors for whom the cost of taking care falls below
the expected losses imposed on others, the optimality of deterrence depends
upon the type of compliance equilibrium that is realized under negligence.
Negligence compels this type of actor to exercise the optimal level of precau-

3. Generally, the definition of type-2 error depends upon the definition of the null hypoth-

esis. However, this article follows the literature in this area by defining an erroneous decision
against the defeiidant as type-2 error (see, e.g., Polinsky and Shavell).
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tion in perfect and in overcompliance equilibria, and less than the optimal
level of precaution in an undercompliance equilibrium.
The effects of increases in the probability of error on incentives to sue and

to take care are then considered. Because the results depend on the type of
equilibrium that occurs under negligence, the effects are shown to be more
complicated than is suggested by the recent discussion in Polinsky and
Shavell. One result that emerges from this analysis is that in a perfect
compliance equilibrium, negligence is robust in its deterrence properties to
small changes in the probability of type-1 or type-2 error.

The standard economic analysis of negligence began with John Brown's
model in which litigation was costless and courts never erred. In that model,

potential injurers exercised socially optimal precaution because they complied with the due-care standard, which was set at the socially optimal care
level.4

The standard model was expanded to incorporate costly litigation in Ordover (1978). Generally, taking litigation costs into account introduces several considerations to the analysis of liability rules. First, since litigation costs

raise the social costs of accidents, the optimal care level changes when
litigation is costly. Second, litigation costs affect the injurer's incentives to
take care, by increasing the losses suffered by an injurer who is sued (assuming such an injurer must bear the cost of bringing suit) and by reducing the
incentive of victims to bring suit.5 Third, because litigation is costly, victims'
incentives to bring suit will depend on their estimate of the probability of
winning the suit, as well as on their expected recovery if they win.

The Ordover article examined compliance in a negligence regime in
which litigation is costly, and concluded that potential injurers, as a group,
undercomplied with the due-care standard. This had to be the result because if all injurers complied or overcomplied, victims would never win a
negligence suit. Given that the victim's rational estimate of the probability of
winning should equal the frequency with which injurers are in fact held
liable, victims would never have an incentive to bring suit in an equilibrium,
such as that in the Brown model, in which injurers complied with the duecare standard. However, if victims never have an incentive to bring suit,
injurers will have no incentive to take care.
In this article, the economic model of negligence is expanded further by
incorporating costly litigation and legal error.
4. A more general approach is taken in Diamond, which examines a general due-care

standard (i.e., one that is not necessarily set at the socially optimal care level). However, if the
due-care standard is set at the socially optimal care level, the analysis presented in the Diamond
article suggests that an equilibrium in which potential injurers comply with the standard would
result.

5. For a discussion of the first two considerations, see Polinsky and Rubinfeld,
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2. THE MODEL

2.1. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

2.1.1. Accident Technology. All actors are assumed to be risk neutral.
is also assumed that victims (plaintiffs) are the only parties who suffer loss
from an accident, the risk of loss to victims can be reduced by the exercise
caution by potential injurers (potential defendants), and that it is costly for

injurers to take care.6

Let p be the probability of loss if potential injurers do not take care, p >
0; and q be the probability of loss if injurers do take care, p > q > 0. Let v be

the (dollar) loss suffered by an accident victim, v > 0. The variable v i
assumed to be random, with distribution function H(v). Specifically, it
assumed that the potential injurer randomly experiences accidents with vic-

tims, each of whom is capable of realizing a specific dollar loss, and the

losses are distributed over the population in accordance with the distribution

function H. Thus, if the potential injurer takes care, the expected loss su
fered by victims is qE(v); and if the injurer does not take care, the expected

loss is pE(v), where

E(v)
o

=

v

d(v).

(1)

Let x be the cost to a potential injurer of taking care, where x > 0. The
variable x is assumed to be random, with distribution function G(x). The
value of x is unobservable to potential victims; however, it is observed by the

injurer, and is known to him when he chooses whether to take care. The
typical injurer will choose not to take care if the expected cost of taking care

exceeds the expected cost of not doing so. Thus, unless the injurer is required to pay damages for either committing an offense or failing to take
care, precaution will not be exercised.
Victims are assumed to be able to sue for no more than the value of their

loss, v. Let ct, be the litigation cost borne by a victim, c% > 0, and co be the
litigation cost borne by an injurer in defending himself against a claim, co > 0.

2.1.2. Legal Error. It will be assumed that courts do not have perfect
information. Thus, courts are unable to determine accurately in every case
whether the defendant, whose behavior gave rise to a lawsuit, acted negligently. With this in mind, let 01 be the probability of type-I error (i.e., that

the court finds a negligent defendant nonnegligent, 0 < 01 < 1); and let 02
6. The model is similar to that presented in Hylton, which, in turn, borrows some of its
basic features from the model presented in Shavell.
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be the probability of type-2 error (i.e., that the court finds a nonnegligent
defendant negligent, 0 < 02 < 1).7
In addition, it will be assumed that courts are sufficiently accurate that 1
- 01 > 02 and, redundantly, 1 - 02 > 1. The former condition requires that
the probability that a negligent defendant will be found negligent exceed the
probability that a nonnegligent defendant will be found negligent; the latter
requires that the probability that a nonnegligent defendant will be found
nonnegligent exceed the probability that a negligent defendant will be found
nonnegligent. The assumption of accuracy is embodied in the following

condition:8

1

-010

-

2

>

0.

(2)

2.2. STRUCTURE OF NEGLIGENCE REGIME

Suit is brought under negligence when wv > c, where w is the probability
that the jury will find the defendant negligent. Thus, the probability that suit

will be brought after an accident has occurred is 1 - H(cl/w).
Under the Hand firmula, an actor is negligent if he fails to take care when

(p - q)E(v) > x. Any actor for whom (p - q)E(v) > x is potentially negligent,
in the sense that he will be held negligent if his failure to take care leads to

an accident which is followed by a lawsuit which the court decides without
error. It is assumed that victims correctly perceive the probability of a
negligence verdict, and thus are aware of the requirements of the Hand
formula. It is also assumed that victims and injurers know 0, and 02.
Each actor will take care when the cost of taking care is less than the cost
of not taking care. Thus, a potentially negligent actor [i.e., an actor for whom

(p - q)E(v) > x] will take care when

x + q[l - H(clw)][02E(vv > cv/w) + Co]

< p[l - H(c,lw)][(1 - O1)E(vlv > c,/w) + cj, (3)

where

E(vlv > c,,w) = v dH(v)/[l - H(cvlw)], (4)

7. This article treats the probabilities of type-i and type-2 errors as given,
and Shavell. This assumption is made in order to simplify the model. A more
tion would allow the error probabilities to depend on the level of precaution
invested into altering the probability of error. For a model in which the l

depends upon the level of precaution, see Craswell and Calfee. The investm
into reducing error is discussed in Tullock (1971: 64-75).
8. This accuracy condition is assumed in Polinsky and Shavell.
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is the expected damage award given that the victim brings suit. Condition (3)
can be rewritten as follows:

x < [1 - HI(cV/W)]{[p(1 - 0,) - q2]E(vlv > cjw) + (p - q)c0}, (5)
where the left-hand side of (5) is the marginal cost of taking care and the
riglit-hand side is the increase in liability that results from failing to take
care. Obviously, when the latter is larger than the former, the potential
injurer will take care.9
An actor that is not potentially negligent [i.e., for whom (p - q)E(v) < x]
will take care when

x + q[l - H(c,/w)][02E(vlv > c,/w) + cj]

< p[l - H(c/w)][02E(vlv > c,,w) + c], (6)

or equivalently, when

x < [1 - H(ct,/w)](p - q)[02E(vlv > clw) + c]. (7)
Since actors perceive the likelihood of a negligence verdict, w is

w = s(l - 1) + (1 - s)02 (8)

where s is the probability that the in
negligent and fails to take care), given
first term in (8) is the probability tha
found nonnegligent by the court; th

defendant is not negligent but is nevert

Using Bayes' theorem,0l that probabili

s = p[gnq + (1 - g,,)p](p - q)E(v)

x

f

[1

-

dG(x),

(9)

HI(cJw)l{[p(

1-01

)

where
g,,
is
the
pro
negligence
and
is
giv
9.

01)

It

-

should

qO2

>

be

0.

noted

that

10.
Expression
(9)
is
the
occurred.
If
victims
are

probability

of

a

negligence
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[1-H(c ,w)]{[p(l-e )-qo2]E(vlv>cuIw)+(p-- q)co}

g.=- dG(x).
0

Note that w can be rewritten as

=

02

+

(1

-

-

0

)-

.

(10)

Equilibrium in a negligence
negligence verdict (i.e., w) be

reg
pos

The reason w must be positive is th
suit. Of course, if victims refuse t

tive

2.3.

to

take

care,

and

EQUILIBRIUM

this

AND

could

COMPLIA

In this section I examine wheth
regime, actors obey the due-car
terms of compliance with the st
when

there

are

actors

for

whom

(p

insufficient to lead them to tak
threat of liability causes some ac
Perfect compliance is observed w
> x are led by the threat of liabi
A preliminary result should be
Proposition

1.

As

long

as

courts

a

holds, the increase in liability that
for a potentially negligent actor th

To prove this, note that for a pot
liability that results from failing t

(5). For an actor who is not poten
given by the right-hand side of
former

The

is

larger

than

importance

However,

its

basic

of

the

latter

if

Proposition

thrust

is

that

if

potentially negligent actors hav
actors who are not potentially n
said

to

discriminate

between
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are so inaccurate that condition (2) fails to hold, potentially negligent actors

may have less incentive to take care than others.ll
As noted earlier, an equilibrium value for the probability of a negligence
verdict satisfies (8). Plaintiffs will bring suit only if the probability of a negli-

gence verdict is positive. Notice, however, that (8) implies the following
compliance equilibrium configurations.
Proposition 2. Under negligence, three types of equilibrium are possible: (i)
one in which the probability of a negligence verdict exceeds the probability
of type-2 error (w > 02) and there is undercompliance; (ii) a second in which

the probability of a negligence verdict is equal to the probability of type-2
error (w = 02) and there is perfect compliance; and (iii) a third in which the
probability of a negligence verdict is equal to the probability of type-2 error

(w = 02) and there is overcompliance.
This is proven by examining (8) and (9). Consider statement (i) of the
above proposition first. Note that the probability of a negligence verdict, w,

is positive if

(p - q)E(v) > [1 - H(c,/w)]{[p(l - 0,) - q2]E(vlv > c,/w)
+

(

-

q)C},

(11)

in which case s > 0, and (10
there is undercompliance am

Proposition

negligent

1,

condition

will

not

take

compliance.
Statement

(p

-

(ii)

is

true

if

q)E(v) c [1 - H(Cvl
+ ( - q)c0}, (12)

and

(p - q)E(v) > [1 - H(c,lw)](p - q)[02E(vv > c,,w) + co]. (13)
Under this set of conditions, only potentially negligent actors will take care.

Furthermore, (12) implies that w = 02.
11. Specifically, if the inequality in condition (2) is reversed, potentially negligent actors will
have less incentive to take care. If the inequality is replaced with an equality, the increase in
liability will be the same for both types of actor.
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Finally, statement (iii) requires that (12) hold and

(p - q)E(v) < [1 - H(cvw)](p - q)[(02E(vlv > c,lv) + co, (14)
where (12) implies w = 02. Under this set of conditions all potentially
negligent actors will take care and some actors who are not potentially
negligent will take care.
This demonstrates that Ordover's result that a rational expectations equilibrium in a negligence regime requires the existence of actors who refuse to

obey the due-care standard does not hold in a regime in which courts err.
The reasoning behind Ordover's proposition is straightforward: if under negligence, all potentially negligent actors [those for whom (p - q)E(v) > x] take
care, then no plaintiff will expect to win a lawsuit, so suit will not be brought;
however, if suit is not brought, no actor will have an incentive to take care.

This argument is no longer valid when it is accepted that courts make mistakes. For in such a negligence regime, plaintiffs will continue to bring suit
even when all injurers are obeying the due-care standard. However, because
plaintiffs have rational expectations they will in effect know that the probability of a negligence verdict, in a perfect or in an overcompliance equilibrium, is just the probability of type-2 error.
It might be said that all claims brought in perfect and in overcompliance
equilibria are "false" or "nuisance" claims. In one sense this must be so

because all potentially negligent actors are taking care in such equilibria.
However, given that plaintiffs have rational expectations, it seems appropriate to say that, in perfect and in overcompliance equilibria, plaintiffs bring

nuisance suits in the sense that their claims are brought in the expectation
that damages will be awarded because of error.

This description of suits is not appropriate in an undercompliance equilibrium. For in such an equilibrium, there is a positive probability, from the
viewpoint of the plaintiff, that the defendant negligently failed to take care;

and since the plaintiff does not observe the injurer's cost of taking care, it
cannot be inferred that plaintiffs are bringing false claims.

It should be noted that Proposition 2 depends on the accuracy condition
stated in (2). This implies that peifect compliance is impossible under negligence unless courts achieve a reasonable degree of accuracy. A perfect compliance equilibrium is possible only because the increase in liability that
results from failing to take care is greater for potentially negligent actors.
Because of this wedge between the marginal liability costs of the two types of
injurer, it is possible for an equilibrium to result in which only the potentially negligent have an incentive to take care.
A second implication of Equations (8) and (9) is the following.
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Proposition 3. A necessary condition for perfect (or over) compliance is 02 > 0.

That is, perfect compliance requires that the probability of type-2 error
be nonzero. If the probability of type-2 error is zero, plaintiffs will sue only if

the probability that the defendant acted negligently is positive, which cannot

happen in a regime of perfect compliance. Thus, complete prevention of
type-2 error12 would eliminate incentives to litigate against defendants who
have obeyed the due-care standard, which is the type of litigation that occurs

in perfect and in overcompliance equilibria. However, when litigation is
costly,13 prevention of type-2 error would have the less desirable effect of
producing a negligence regime in which only an undercompliance equilibrium can result.14 An additional implication of Proposition 2 is that an
overcompliance equilibrium should in principle be distinguishable from an
undercompliance equilibrium by comparing the probability of a negligence
verdict with the probability of type-2 error. 15
2.4. OPTIMALITY OF CARE

This section examines whether the care levels of injurers in a negligence
regime will be socially optimal.
Given an equilibrium in a negligence regime, taking care is socially desirable if, after the realization of x,

12. In theory there are two ways in which type-2 error could be virtually eliminated. One is
to make the standard of proof as high as possible: for example, requiring that the evidence prove

beyond the slightest doubt that the defendant acted negligently. Negligence verdicts would
almost never occur, but the rate of type-2 error would be driven close to zero. A second
approach is to make technological improvements in the gathering of evidence: for example,
using lie detector tests in court. For discussion of the latter approach, see Tullock (1971: 76104).

13. I emphasize the presence of litigation costs because the undercompliance result of
Ordover depends upon litigation being costly. If litigation were costless, perfect compliance
would result. [See, e.g., Ordover (1978, 1981).]
14. Of course, complete prevention of type-2 error is impossible, but continuity implies
that the same criticism can be offered for efforts to minimize type-2 error. As 02 is driven toward

zero, the more likely an undercompliance equilibrium is. Perhaps it should be noted here that
instead of treating the probabilities of type-1 and type-2 error as constants, one alternative is to
assume that parties attempt to alter these probabilities through investing in litigation. Thus, the
plaintiff increases c,, in the hope of maximizing type-2 error, and minimizing type-I error, and
the defendant alters co in a manner that maximizes type-1 error and minimizes type-2 error. For
the purposes of this article, the interesting implication of such an approach is that under certain
conditions the parties can, through investing in litigation, affect the type of compliance equi-

librium that emerges under negligence.
15. Craswell and Calfee conclude that overcompliance is likely to be common in "a variety
of situations where the uncertainty is relatively small." The results of the model presented in
this article may provide a simple way of testing for overcompliance. Tullock (1980: 31-3)
estimates that the probability of error is roughly k. If 1 can be taken to be the probability of
type-2 error under a proponderance of the evidence standard, this number might be compared
with estimates of the likelihood of a negligence verdict.

This content downloaded from 128.197.229.194 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020 17:26:51 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

COSTLY LITIGATION AND LEGAL ERROR / 443

pE(v) + p[l - H(cvIw)](c, + c,)
> x + qE(v) + q[l - H(cdlw)](c, + c,), (15)
or, alternatively,

x < (p - q)E(v) + (p - q)[l - H(c,/Iw)](c + c,). (16)

The right-hand side of (16) is the marginal social cost of failing to take ca
or, alternatively, the marginal social benefit of additional care-which is th

same whether or not the actor is potentially negligent.
If not all actors for whom taking care is socially desirable have incentiv
to take care under negligence, it will be said that underdeterrence ex
Overdeterrence results when there are actors, for whom taking care i
socially desirable, who are nevertheless led by the threat of liability to ta
care. Optimal deterrence occurs when only those actors for whom tak
care is socially desirable take care under negligence.
The following results are implied by Proposition 2 and the preced
comments.

Proposition 4. In an undercompliance equilibrium, negligence underd

This is proven by noting that in an undercompliance equilibrium n
gence underdeters potentially negligent actors if and only if

(p - q)E(v) + (p - q)[1 - H(c,/w)](c, + c,)
> [1 - H(cvlw)]{[p(1 - 01)- q02]E(vlv > c/w)
+ (p - q)co}. (17)
However,

given

(11),

this

compliance equilibrium. In a
potentially negligent will a
equilibrium.

Proposition 5. In a perfect compliance or in an overcompliance equilibrium,
(i) negligence underdeters actors who are not potentially negligent; and (ii)
potentially negligent actors take care and, thus, are optimally deterred.

Statement (i) of Proposition 5 is proven by noting that whether the equilibrium is one of perfect or of overcompliance, actors who are not potentially

negligent are underdeterred if and only if

(p - q)E(v) + (p - q)[ - H(c,lw)](c, + c)
> [1 - H(c,lw)](p - q)[02E(vlv > c,/w) + cj]. (18)
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But this reduces to

fv dH(v)02 < E(v) + [1 - H(c, /w)] c,
cJt

which, given the definition of E(v) in (1), is easily shown to hold.
Statement 2 follows from the definition of perfect and overcompliance
equilibria. In both types of equilibrium, actors for whom x < (p - q)E(v)
take care. Since, for such actors, the cost of taking care is less than the social
cost of failing to take care, this is efficient.
Note that (17) can be expressed as follows:
00

I v dH{[p(l - 01) - q02](p - q)} < E(v) + [1 - H(c,w)]c,. (
cJw

It follows from this that in an undercompliance equilibrium, error can enhance deterrence as long as the difference p(l - 01) - q02 is greater than p

- q. Since the condition p - q < p(l - 0) - q02 is equivalent to p01 < q(l

- 02), Proposition 5 implies the following.

Proposition 6. If p0i < q(l - 02), then error enhances deterrence in an
undercompliance equilibrium.
Thus, if the probability of not being held negligent when one has not
taken care (p80) is less than the probability of not being held negligent when

one has taken care [q(1 - 02)], then error enhances deterrence in an undercompliance equilibrium. An alternative way of stating this result is that error

cannot enhance deterrence in an undercompliance equilibrium unless the
condition of Proposition 6 liolds, which places a higher burden of accuracy
on courts than does condition (ii).16
A rather disheartening conclusion follows from Propositions 4 and 5:
given the due-care standard defined by the Hand formula, negligence un16. The desire to structure rules of criminal procedure in a way that minimizes the risk that
an innocent defendant will be convicted has been expressed as an aphorism that it is better that
guilty defendants go unconvicted than to convict innocent defendants [see In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970)]. Although this a model of civil litigation, such a rule could be seen in terms of
this model as requiring that p01 < q02. This is not inconsistent with the requirement that pi0 <
q(1 - 02). Htowever, there is tension between the two conditions because not all values of p01
and (02 that satisfy the former inequality will satisfy the latter. In light of this, deterrence seems
to be a questionable argument for sacrificing reductions in the rate at which type-I error occurs
in order to reduce the fiequency of type-2 error. See Wittman.
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derdeters. The reason is that actors who are not potentially negligent never
have incentives to exercise the socially optimal level of precaution. Now it
may be argued that society should not want such actors to take care, since
the cost of taking care exceeds the marginal losses imposed on others. [owever, in a system in which litigation is costly, this understates the social cost
of failing to take care; the social cost of failing to take care is the marginal loss

imposed on others plus the additional litigation costs imposed on society.
Given this, there are actors who are not potentially negligent, unider the
Hand formula definition of the due-care standard, for whom taking care is
still socially desirable. The only way to compel such actors to take care is to
internalize the social cost of failing to take care. But this clearly happens at a

socially inadequate rate under negligence because the only costs that are
internalized to actors who are not potentially negligent are the damages that
are awarded because of type-2 error. Since this is far below the level of cost

that should be internalized in order to compel such actors to exercise the
socially optimal amount of precaution, negligence fails to compel actors who

would not be required to take care under the Hand formula to exercise the
optimal level of precaution.
The failure of negligence to compel all potential injurers to exercise socially optimal precaution can be corrected by modifying the due-care standard to incorporate litigation costs.17 Under such a modified due-care standard, negligence would optimally deter in a perfect compliance equilibrium,

and an overcompliance equilibrium would be infeasible. This is demonstrated by observing that because (19) holds, any actor who would not be
potentially negligent under the modified due-care standard (i.e., any actor
whose precaution cost exceeds the marginal social benefit of additional care)

would never take care, whatever the equilibrium. This is a desirable outcome because it is inefficient for such actors to take care. However, potentially negligent actors, given the modified due-care standard, would take
care in a perfect compliance equilibrium. This, again, is a desirable result
because it is efficient for such actors to take care. Thus, with the due-care
standard modified to incorporate litigation costs, optimal deterrence is a
feasible outcome under negligence.
It might be asked in light of this discussion whether legal error under
negligence really imposes costs on society. The typical discussion assumes
that it does,18 and assumes that the goal of procedural safeguards should be

to minimize legal error subject to relevant constraints. The results of this
section suggest that the social desirability of legal error is not so easily
17. In other words, the Hand formula would have to be modified so that it requires a
comparison between the cost of taking care (i.e., x) and the social benefit of additional care,

which is (p - q)E(v) + (p - q)[1 - H(c,,/w)](co + c,).
18. See, for example, Posner (400-1).
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determined when litigation costs are taken into account. The social desirability of legal error depends on the desirability of the alternative state in
which there is no error. If the state in which there is no legal error is one in
which injurers take too little care relative to the social optimum, then legal
error may be a desirable feature on second-best grounds.
2.5. EFFECTS ON INCENTIVES TO LITIGATE AND TO TAKE CARE

This section examines the effect of increases in error on incentives to litigate
and on deterrence. It should be noted that error can be increased in two

ways. One is to alter the technology or process of evidence production or
evaluation so that the probability of type-1 or type-2 error increases while
the standard of proof is held fixed. The other is to alter the standard of proof.

While it is possible to imagine a technological change that alters the probability of only one type of error-for example, subsidizing the defendant's
production of evidence-an increase in the standard of proof will reduce
type-2 error and increase type-i error simultaneously. Since the discussion
below proceeds as if one type of error can be increased without also altering
the other type, it should be understood as implicitly assuming technological
change rather than an alteration in the standard of proof. The results, how-

ever, can easily be applied to the case in which the standard of proof is

altered.

2.5.1. Incentives to Litigate. Recall that under negligence, the probability that suit will be brought is 1 - H(cvIw). Thus, legal error alters
incentives to litigate only through its effect on w.

In light of the foregoing, the effects of error on incentives to litigate
depend upon whether the type of equilibrium that results is one of over-,
perfect, or undercompliance. In a perfect or an overcompliance equilibrium,

w = 02; thus,
aw

O2

O,

-1v 1

It follows that in a perfect or an overcompliance equilibrium, an increase in
the probability of type-l error will have no effect on the incentive to litigate,
and an increase in the probability of type-2 error will increase the incentive

to litigate. The intuition behind this is straightforward. In a perfect or an
overcompliance equilibrium the probability of a negligence verdict is the
probability of type-2 error. Since this is assumed not to be a function of the
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probability of type-1 error, type-1 error is irrelevant insofar as the incentive

to bring suit is concerned.
In an undercompliance equilibrium, (9) implies that s = s(w01, 02); where
as/dw < 0, because if victims are more likely to sue, potential injurers will,

other things equal, take more care; s/ld02 > 0, because if even the innocent
will be found guilty, potential injurers will have less incentive to take care;
and as/daO > 0, because if plaintiffs are less likely to win, because negligent

defendants are being found nonnegligent, potential injurers will have less
incentive to take care.19
In an undercompliance equilibrium, the effect of an increase in type-2
error on the probability of a negligence verdict is given by the following
expression:

aw _ 1 - s + (1 - 0 - 02)ds 2> (20)

aO2~ 1 - (1 , - 62))s/w 0)

Thus, in an undercompliance equilibrium an increase in the probability of
type-2 error increases the incentive to litigate. An increase in the probability
of type-2 error has this effect for two reasons: first, it increases the plaintiffs
likelihood of winning against a given defendant, because some nonnegligent
defendants will be found negligent; second, it increases the amount of negli-

gent behavior, thus increasing the probability that a given defendant behaved negligently.
The effect of type-1 error on the probability of a negligence verdict in an
undercompliance equilibrium is given by the following expression:

aw -s + (1 - 01 - 2)0s/d01
ao 1 - (1- 1 - 02)as/aw '

(21)

the sign of which is ambiguous. Thus, in an undercompliance equil

an increase in the probability of type-1 error has an ambiguous impact
incentive to litigate. Type-1 error has two opposing effects on the ince

to litigate. It lowers the incentive to sue because it increases the probab

that the defendant will be found nonnegligent. However, it increa

amount of negligent behavior and, therefore, increases the probability

given defendant's behavior was negligent. This increases the incent
sue. The net effect of type-1 error on the incentive to sue is the
ambiguous.
The only other study to examine this issue in a theoretical model, Pol19. The signs can be proven explicitly using (8) and (9).
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insky and Shavell, concluded that type-i error reduces incentives to litigate,
while type-2 error increases incentives to litigate. The reason for this finding
was that type-1 errors increase the likelihood that the defendant will prevail,
while type-2 errors increase the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail. The

results of the Polinsky and Shavell article are not replicated here because
they were derived under the assumption that the probability the defendant
acted negligently is unaffected by type-i and type-2 errors.

2.5.2. Effects on Deterrence. This section examines the effect of an
increase in legal error on the probability that a potential injurer will take
care under negligence. The conclusion depends on the type of equilibrium
that results under negligence.
In an undercompliance equilibrium in a negligence regime, the probability that a potential injurer will be deterred (i.e., led by the threat of
liability to take care) is
[1 - H(cv/t)l{[p(l -0)-q02]E(vlv>cV/w)+(p- q)c}c

g=

I

dG(x).

(22)

0

Note that (22) implies g,, = g,(w,01,02); where dg,n/02 < 0, because an
increase in the likelihood that a nonnegligent defendant will be found negli-

gent reduces the incentives of potentially negligent actors to take care;
where ag,,/al0 < 0, because an increase in the likelihood that a negligent
defendant will be found nonnegligent reduces the incentives of potentially
negligent actors to take care; where ag,,lIw > 0, because an increase in the
probability of a negligence verdict increases incentives to take care.
In an undercompliance equilibrium, the effect of an increase in type-2
error on the probability that an actor is deterred is given by the following

expression:

dg, - g g+ dgn w (23)

2- a02 aw a02'

the sign of which is ambiguous because the first term in (23) is negativ

the terms multiplied together are both positive. Thus, in an

compliance equilibrium, the effect of an increase in type-2 error on
rence is ambiguous because an increase in type-2 error reduces the
tives of potentially negligent actors to take care, but increases the ince
of victims to sue.

The effect of an increase in type-i error on the probability that an actor is

deterred in an undercompliance equilibrium is given by the following
expression:
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dgn _ agt + agn aw (24)

Jo-, a0, aw ae0

The first term in (24) is negative, the sign of the second term is ambiguous.
The reason the sign of the second term is ambiguous is that the sign of awl

d01 is itself ambiguous, given (21). Thus, in an undercompliance equilibrium, an increase in the frequency of type-i error has an ambiguous
impact on deterrence. The impact of type-l error is ambiguous because it is
unclear whether type-i error increases or decreases the incentives of victims
to sue.

In a perfect compliance equilibrium in a negligence regime, the
bility that a potential injurer will be deterred is
(p-q)E(v)

g

=

dG(x).

(25)

0

Thus, in a perfect compliance equilibrium, small increases in the probability
of type-i or type-2 error have no effect on deterrence. This is not to say that
error is irrelevant insofar as deterrence is concerned. Error is not irrelevant

because if the probability of type-2 error were driven to zero, a perfect
compliance equilibrium would not be feasible. Iowever, an interesting implication of the divergence (or discontinuity) in marginal liability costs noted
in Proposition 1 is that a perfect compliance equilibrium under negligence is
fairly robust in its deterrence properties to small changes in the frequency of

error.20

In an overcompliance equilibrium in a negligence regime, the probability
that a potential injurer will be deterred is
[ 1-H(c,Jtv)](p-q)[ 02E(vlt>c,/w ) + Col

g.n=

dG(x).

(26)

0

Note that (26) implies g, = g,,(w,Ol,02); where g,/IO1 = 0, because an
increase in the probability of a type-i error is of no concern to the nonnegligent; where dgnl/02 > 0, because an increase in the likelihood that a
nonnegligent defendant will be found negligent increases the incentives of
actors who are not potentially negligent to take care; and where ag,n/w > 0.
The effect of increases in type-i and type-2 errors, in an overcompliance

equilibrium, are expressed as follows:
20. This is consistent with the analysis of "threshold effects" in Cooter.
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d

-

0,

(27)

dg,t - gn + g 3w 9(28)

R02 a02 aw 002

Given that w = 02 in an overcompliance equilibrium, the sign of (28) is
positive. Thus, in an overcompliance equilibrium, an increase in the probability of type-i error has no effect on deterrence, and an increase in the
probability of type-2 error increases deterrence. The reason for this is that
the marginal actor (i.e., the one who is almost indifferent as between taking
care and not taking care) is, in an overcompliance equilibrium, an actor who
is not potentially negligent. For such an actor, type-2 error is the only kind of
error that matters, and an increase in type-2 error increases the portion of
expected victim losses for which he in effect will be held strictly liable.

The results under the assumption that an undercompliance equilibrium
holds are largely in agreement with those of Polinsky and Shavell.21 However, since their analysis does not reveal that perfect or overcompliance
equilibria of the type described here can result, their model does not distinguish the different effects of type-I error increases in under- and in over-

compliance equilibria.22
3. CONCLUSION

It has been shown in this article that perfect and overcomplianc

can result in a negligence regime in which litigation is costly and co

It also has been shown that underdeterrence must result under n
unless the Hand formula is modified to incorporate litigation cos
An implication of this article is that legal error may have desirab
best properties in a negligence regime in which litigation is cos

21. Polinsky and Shavell note that type-I and type-2 errors have an ambiguou
incentives to take care because the probability of suit is affected by error. Posner
Ehrlich and Posner (262-4) argue that type-1 and type-2 errors reduce incentives t
I-owever, the Posner and the Ehrlich and Posner articles fail to take into account t
error on the probability of suit.
22. It was noted earlier that an increase in the standard of proof would increase
and reduce type-2 error simultaneously. The results derived above can be used to e
effects of an increase in the standard of proof. If X is the standard of proof, then
both finctions of X, where d0l/dX > 0 and d02/dX < 0. The effect of an increase in
of proof on the probability of negligence verdict is then given by the formula

dw _ aw dO, aow dO2
dX aOl dX a02 dX'
which can be used to reach conclusions similar to those derived in the text.
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error can offset or counterbalance the tendency of a negligence regime in
which litigation is costly to result in undercompliance and underdeterrence

(see Ordover, 1978; Hylton). Thus, on deterrence grounds alone (i.e.,

whether the enforcement regime gives actors incentives to exercise socially

optimal precaution), it is unclear whether a negligence regime in which
there is no legal error is superior to one in which there is legal error.23
The model developed in this article has also been used to show that the
effects of increases in legal error on incentives to sue, and on deterrence, are
more complicated than has been suggested in previous analyses. In particular, it is shown that the effects depend on the type of equilibrium that is

observed.
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